High commodity prices have attracted close attention recently. Aside of a variety of macroeconomic explanations, some specific microeconomic factors have been proposed as the cause of a previously non-existing connection between energy prices and food prices. Specifically, ethanol promotion policies in the United States would have created a link between oil and corn prices that would be the cause of the recent rally in the price of that crop and its substitutes (especially soybeans). Even though it is intuitively appealing, one problem with this hypothesis is that ethanol policies have been in place in the US for more than 35 years, whereas the run up in food prices dates back only to 2006. I interpret a significant change in US biofuel policy during 2006 as a natural experiment that could help in identifying changes in the stochastic properties of the corn and soybean price processes. The results are sharp but to some extent unexpected: there are substantial changes in the dynamic properties of corn and soybean prices time series, they are more closely related to oil prices, but the predictive causality seems to run in reverse, from the crops to oil prices.
Introduction
The remarkable rally in commodity prices since the start of the new century, even in the face of the most acute financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression, has raised the concern of policymakers and commentators alike. Volatility has increased significantly since 2008, but after a sharp drop in the last quarter of 2008, commodity prices have quickly returned to levels that are close to, or in some cases higher than, the already lofty peaks reached before the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Several macroeconomic explanations for the widespread rise in the prices of all sorts of commodities have been proposed. 2 The usual suspects are the expansive monetary policy pursued by central banks since the onset of the crisis in the second half of 2007, the growing financialisation of commodity markets, and increased demand for basic materials from rapidly growing emerging markets. All of these hypotheses have merits but also theoretical drawbacks, and the empirical evidence is not conclusive. However, a clear understanding of the circumstances and causes of the current strength of commodity markets is relevant for both developed and emerging markets. For developed markets, typically net importers of commodities, such understanding would allow them to adjust policy in order to counter a substantial drag on growth, and a worrying source of inflationary pressures. For many emerging markets, especially in Latin America, high commodity prices underpin the solid fiscal and external positions that these countries have enjoyed in the last few years, and such understanding would help policy-makers assess the risk for their own macroeconomic outlook.
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In this paper, I step out of the typical emphasis on macroeconomic drivers and, focusing on agricultural commodity prices, I explore the impact that energy policy in advanced economies (eg the promotion of biofuels) has had on food markets. Biofuels have long been considered a potential source of disruption in the market for those crops that are basic inputs for their production (mainly corn and soybeans). However, there are few quantitative assessments of their relevance and the nature of their impact. Zhang et al. (2009) , using data through December 2007, found not long-term relationship between oil and food (corn and soybeans)
prices. In the short run, they found no relationship, although before 1999 causality seems to run in reverse of the expected direction (from crops to oil and ethanol). Marshad and 2 See Frankel and Rose (2010) for a summary. Also IIF (2010) . 3 See, for instance Avalos (2011) , Cecchetti and Moessner (2008) . Hameed (2009) , using a longer sample, find evidence of a long term relationship between oil, corn, wheat and rice, with causality flowing from the fuel to the crops. They relate this effect to cost factors, namely, the growing reliance by modern agriculture on seed fertilizer technology that is highly dependent on chemical inputs derived from oil. They also argue that biofuel production is another dimension of the problem. But they focus on the indirect effect of acreage competition between wheat and corn. As explained below, that is probably not a major factor for wheat (as it is for soybeans) since wheat and corn have limited land overlap.
Trujillo- Barrera et al. (2011) study volatility spillovers in the US from energy to agricultural markets in the period 2006-2011. They found significant spillovers from oil to corn and ethanol markets, which seem to be particulary strong in high volatility periods for oil markets.
They also identified significant volatility spillovers from corn to ethanol markets.
Being the largest producer of corn, and also the place of one of the longest running programs for the promotion of corn-based ethanol, the US and its energy policy are natural focal points of concern. Here, I attempt to exploit a natural experiment arising from a significant change in 2006 on the nature of ethanol policies in the US to assess the relationship between oil, corn and soybean prices. The results are at once unsurprising and intriguing: price dynamics in those two staple crops have changed significantly since 2006, but not in a way entirely consistent with biofuel critics' ex-ante concerns.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews some of the main stylised facts about commodity prices in the last 30 years; section 3 explains as clearly and briefly as possible the sequence of ethanol-promotion policies in the US, and how the aforementioned natural experiment arose. Section 4 describes the data, and analyses the time series properties of oil, corn and soybean prices before and after the breaking point mentioned. Section 5 concludes and indicates potential directions for further research.
Some stylised facts
For almost 20 years, starting in the early 1980s, the main classes of commodities (agriculture, industrial metals, and energy) traded in relatively narrow price bands, without any clear trend. That changed in the late 90´s, when nominal prices began rising for energy (essentially oil) and industrial metals. In roughly 6 years, those commodities increased their prices four-fold, and continued rising. Agricultural commodities took off much later, around Biofuel promotion has for some time been a feature of energy policies in advanced and emerging market economies. Brazil and the United States operate two of the longest-running programmes, dating back to the 1970s. Brazil produces ethanol from sugarcane by a relatively energy-efficient process. On the other hand, the United States produces cornbased ethanol in a process that is generally regarded as less efficient, with limited net-carbon fuel savings. 5 The fiscal cost of federal ethanol subsidies in the United States was relatively small, ranging between USD 5 -7 billion. 6 However, subsidies seemed to have a relevant impact on the industry economics, the size of the sector, and its demand of corn. On the other hand, although soy-oil can be an input in the production of biodiesel, the main connection between petrol and soybean prices would work through corn. There would exist two main transmission mechanisms from higher corn prices to higher soybean prices: first, the competition for planting acreage, since both crops share quite similar soil and climatic requirements. Moreover, corn and soybeans share several industrial uses (eg as animal feedstock) and substitution from pricier corn to soybeans could be another factor weighing on the latter´s demand and, eventually, price. 5 In other words, the unit cost of ethanol produced is too high (by international standards), and the amount of energy liberated by the consumption of ethanol so produced is roughly similar to the energy used to produce it. As a comparison, Brazil's sugarcane ethanol yields roughly eight times more energy per unit of energy input. See B Yacobucci (2006) .
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Federal subsidies and tariffs were allowed to expire as of 31 December 2011, but for reasons I will describe below, they had stopped being the main source of support for the ethanol industry a few years ago.
Disentangling the impact of ethanol-promotion policies on the price dynamics of oil, corn and soybeans would be complicated. Just tracking the marginal adjustments of subsidies at the federal and state levels over the span of almost 40 years would be a daunting task, with little potential gain. As it happens, chance has provided a natural experiment, in the form of a major policy change, which greatly simplified matters. oxygen. This causes a more efficient combustion of fuels (ie increasing the energy produced by each gallon of gasoline burned). This was a crucial change in the nature of the energy policy, since it migrated from a pure structure of subsidies and tariffs, which predictably affected incentives, to a form of quantitative mandate whose full set of repercussions are harder to ascertain in advance. It was also the precedent for the policy change that, I argue below, caused a structural change in the corn market.
A brief history of ethanol
At the time, ethanol was only one of the additives that could be mixed with regular gasoline in order to increase its oxygen content. Another organic chemical compound, methyl tertiary butyl ether (or MTBE), was also widely used in the United States and for years represented the main domestic competition for corn-based ethanol. As MTBE is a petroleum or natural gas derivative, it was preferred in most non-agricultural regions because it was generally much cheaper than ethanol, as well as more widely available and easier to transport and 7 See Koplow, D (2006 Before the passing of the 2005 Act, critics had warned that corn prices would increase as a result. On the face of it, the price impact was swift. Since the early 80's, corn had traded in a relatively narrow band of USD 2-3 per bushel. In fact, during the 10 years before the Energy Independence Act came into force, the price had oscillated gently around USD 2 per bushel. The apparent impact on quantities was also remarkable. In 2000, only about 5% of US corn production (the world´s largest) was used for ethanol production. This share jumped to almost 13% in 2003-2005, after California and New York banned the use of MTBE, and to almost 23% by 2007, the first full year after the Energy Independence Act came into force.
By 2010, more than 35% of the US corn harvest was used to produce ethanol (Graph 4). In fact, the only use of US corn that has increased at all in the last 10 years is ethanol production, and most of it happened after 2003. All other uses (feed and residual, export, other industrial non-ethanol) have stayed roughly constant or even declined, although total US production has increased by almost 38% during this period (Graph 5). That is to say that most of the growth in US corn production since 2003 has been applied to the production of ethanol. The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) 8 projects that the use 8 This is a research programme established in 1984 by a Congressional grant to prepare baseline projections for the US agricultural sector and international commodity markets and to develop capability for policy analysis of corn for ethanol production will stay largely constant at around 36% of the US harvest for the foreseeable future.
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But US energy policy is hardly an exception. Worldwide government intervention has strongly favoured biofuel production, and probably will continue. 9 If the biofuel industry is having any significant impact on the market for corn and soybeans, that is unlikely to recede soon.
Empirical analysis
This section analyses spot price data on these three commodities to investigate whether their dynamic properties changed since the Energy Independence Act become effective. In particular, I will search for evidence that changes in corn and soybean prices have become more closely related with changes in oil prices. Once the renewable fuel standard became enforceable and MTBE stopped being a viable alternative to ethanol, the use of corn for ethanol production surged very quickly, and acquired a size large enough to have an impact on corn's global market. The intuition is straightforward: the higher the price of oil, the higher is the incentive of gasoline producers to bring to market blends with a higher content of using comprehensive data and computer modelling systems for the world agricultural market. FAPRI is hosted by Iowa State University and the University of Missouri.
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The EU has its own ambitious biodiesel programme, with subsidies and quantitative targets. Other countries are also developing their own, highly subsidised programmes, including Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Peru, the Philippines and Thailand. FAPRI estimates that these programmes will collectively almost double the output of ethanol (from several sources) over the next 15 years, while biodiesel production should increase by 45%.
ethanol. They bid up the price of ethanol, and ethanol producers in turn bid up the price of corn. As the price of corn increases, the prices of its close substitutes in other uses (industrial, animal feed, etc.) also increase. In the medium term, higher corn prices causes a larger share of arable land to be dedicated to the production of corn, restricting the supply of other crops with which it competes for acreage. Both mechanisms point to soybeans as the main receivers of these second round effects.
To test this intuition, I estimate time series models to analyse the long and short term dynamics of the prices of oil, corn and soybeans before and after May 2006, when the Energy Independence Act of 2005 became applicable.
The data
I use commodity benchmark daily price data from Datastream, starting on 1 January 1986
(the earliest available for all three commodities). I calculate monthly averages of daily data, to allow for some information aggregation and average out extreme observations. For the purpose of providing some context, I also review price data for other key commodities, in particular copper and gold. Table 1 The second half of Table 1 shows correlations between the prices of all five commodities in both subsamples. As expected, given the shared rally, price correlations increased in most cases. However, the correlation between the prices of oil and gold, and copper and gold Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix The baseline period: January 1986 -April 2006
Graph 6 shows the price paths (in logs) for the three commodities during the baseline period.
On inspection, the data seem to reveal an apparent absence of trend in corn and soybean data, and also low persistence: prices seem to revert to the mean relatively quickly. That is mimicked by oil prices until early 1999, but then they start a strong rally which brings them to much higher levels than in the previous decade. Accordingly, standard unit root tests reject the non-stationary null hypothesis for corn and soy at customary 5% significance levels (Appendix Table A1 ). Correlograms of the first difference of both series suggest that the residuals are autocorrelated, so I also test the unit root hypothesis using the Phillip-Perron statistic, which yield similar results. On the other hand, oil prices are found to be stationary in first differences, and non-stationary in levels. 10 The coefficients of deterministic linear trends are non-significantly different from zero in most cases. Based on these results, I estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) in first differences of all variables to investigate the short run interactions between these commodity prices during the baseline period. Differencing price data for corn and soybeans might seem unnecessary given their stationarity, but it makes for a more intuitive interpretation of the results.
10 First differences of corn and soybean log prices strongly reject the respective unit-root hypotheses, indicating that they are stationary as well, as expected. Next I proceed to evaluate the price dynamics implied by the model, by computing impulse response functions. The elasticities to the fundamental shocks are identified through a Cholesky decomposition where the oil price is considered exogenous. The Cholesky ordering is completed by corn and soybeans. This ordering corresponds to our basic hypothesis: oil price shocks affect corn prices, which eventually impact on soybean prices. Moreover, corn price shocks affect soybean prices, but neither corn nor soybean price shocks affect oil prices. I will focus initially on the responses of prices to oil shocks. Alternatively, I will report also the responses to corn price shocks, as an alternative experiment suggested by the Granger-causality tests. Notice that this is a first step into a structural analysis, but we should be cautious in the interpretation of the results. This model is just too simple to implement a fully structural analysis, where specific shocks in global demand and monetary policy should be modelled explicitly, with actual commodity price shocks resulting as residuals. That is particularly relevant in the second part of the sample, where the magnitude of fundamental shocks to global demand and monetary policy were probably larger.
The results of a one standard deviation positive shock to oil prices are presented in Graph 7, upper row. I report cumulated impulse responses, to gauge the overall impact on price levels.
The shock causes a permanent increase in oil prices, larger than the original shock, and clearly different from zero. The impact on crop prices is negative, with both the price of corn and soybeans decreasing permanently with respect to their pre-shock levels. However, the Turning to the alternative experiment involving a one standard deviation positive corn price shock Graph 7 (lower row) shows that it had a significant permanent impact on soybean prices. That is consistent with our initial intuition about the effect of substitution and acreage competition effects on the soybean market. The final impact on corn prices is also positive, clearly different from zero and larger than the original shock and the response of soybean prices. The effect on oil prices is relatively small, and not very statistically significant, since the upper bound of the two standard error confidence interval overlaps with zero. Even allowing for a significant effect of corn price shocks on oil prices, this result indicates that the latter would be depressed by a positive corn price shock. In other words, before the enactment of the pre-Energy Independence Act, either corn and and oil prices had no relationship, or they behaved as complementary goods: corn price shocks somehow reduced the expenditure on oil to the extent of reducing its price, and viceversa.
In summary, before the Energy Independence Act of 2005, corn and soybean prices were stationary, whereas oil prices seemed to have a unit-root and had a relatively small and possibly negative impact in the long or short run price dynamics of the other two food commodities. In particular, oil price shocks exhibited no predictive causality over corn and soybean prices. However, as have been documented in other studies, corn prices did impact soybean prices in the short run.
Testing for a structural break: May 2006
The next step will be to test for the existence of a structural break on or around processes with an iid distribution and time invariant covariance matrix. The forecast test is reported for completeness, but it requires normality of the disturbances, which does not hold in this case. For the purpose of my test of structural break, it is important to remark that the break-point test is broader than the sample-split test, because the former allows for differences in the covariance matrix of the full sample model, whereas the latter assumes that this covariance matrix is constant across sub-samples. In other words, the sample-split test only allows for differences in the VAR equations coefficients.
Since Candelon and Lütkepohl (2001) show that these tests can be seriously distorted in small samples, I follow their suggestion of bootstrapping the residuals of the original VAR model estimation, and recomputing the tests for the bootstrapped system a large number of times (4000). I report both the asymptotic distribution and bootstrapped probability values of the tests.
The results are shown in 
After the Energy Independence Act: May 2006 -April 2012
Graph 8 shows the path followed by the prices (in logs) of oil, corn and soybeans (respectively, from left to right). Aside from the steep plunge in all three commodity prices during 4Q08, the most remarkable feature is the positive drift in the prices of corn and soybeans, absent in the previous period. Standard unit-root tests confirm that it is no longer possible to reject the non-stationarity hypothesis for the log prices of corn and soybeans. 12 However, augmented-Dickey Fuller tests reject non-stationarity for oil prices. Presumably, the sharp drop in oil prices during the 4Q08 could be creating autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity problems that might be reducing the efficiency of the estimation.
Examining the residuals of the augmented-Dickey Fuller regression, I find no evidence of autocorrelation. But White´s general test rejects the homoskedastic null hypothesis (Appendix Table A3 ). Therefore, I focus on the Phillips-Perron test results, which do not reject the unit root null for log oil prices (Appendix Table A2 ). The next step involves testing for the existence of cointegration among the three price series.
I start with bilateral Johansen tests (Appendix Table A4 ), which find that the log prices of oil and corn were cointegrated. Moreover, the tests also reject cointegration of the price pairs of oil-soybeans (at the 10% significance level), and corn-soybeans. The results support two important changes in the price dynamics of corn (and soybean) prices in this sub-sample:
both crop prices are no longer stationary, and corn prices seem to be cointegrated with oil prices. In other words, there is now a long-run relationship between these prices that links them together in a stable fashion, which was not identified before May 2006.
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With cointegration established, I proceed to test whether it holds for the three price series pooled together (as opposed to conducting 3 separate tests), and based on the findings of the bilateral tests, I impose the constrain that the coefficient of soybean prices in the cointegrating vector is equal to zero. Once again, the data support the existence of a single cointegrating vector, and the restriction on the soybean price coefficient in that vector cannot be rejected (see Appendix Table A4 ).
Next I investigate the short run price dynamics of the three commodities by the estimation of a vector error correction model (VECM). Again it is a very simple model only involving the cointegrating vector and lags of the endogenous variables. A Wald lag exclusion test determines an optimal 2-lag structure for the model. erased in about a year. Once again, this is counter-intuitive: in most policy discussion about this topic, the concern is about the swings in food prices causes by oil prices changes. This result shows that in the long-run the adjustment seem to flow from corn to oil markets.
14 The Granger-causality tests shown in Table 6 also bring some unexpected results: first, they strongly reject that oil prices individually Granger-cause corn prices. In fact, data lends more support to the hypothesis that soybean prices are Granger-caused by oil prices, which cannot be rejected at a 10% significance level. Moreover, joint Granger-causality of oil prices from corn and soybean prices is established at the standard 5% significance level. 15 All this point to interesting connections between oil prices and these food staple prices, but quite different from those anticipated by the usual discussion about the potential impact of biofuel promotion policies.
VEC model Granger causality tests Finally, Graph 9 displays the impulse responses implied by the estimated model to a one standard deviation shock in oil and corn prices. The upper row of the graph shows the response to an oil price shock. The response of corn prices is not very precisely estimated, but it seems significant and builds up over a period of a year. Moreover, the impact of oil price shocks on corn prices is now positive, contrary to the finding during the baseline period.
The effect on soybean prices is also positive but more muted. In both cases, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the response is trivial, since the zero response is within the 95% confidence interval. The bottom row presents impulse responses to a corn price shock.
It now has a clearly significant impact in both oil and soybean prices. As in the previous case, the effect on oil prices is positive, implying that oil and corn behaved as substitutive goods in this sub-period, probably because energy can be produced now by either burning oil, or corn (as ethanol). Granger-causality flowing from crop prices to oil prices. As for price dynamics, oil price shocks now have a positive and significant effect on corn prices, and viceversa. As usual, soybean prices respond mutely to oil price shocks and strongly to corn price shocks.
Conclusions
High commodity prices are a relevant feature of the current macroeconomic landscape. They are a cause of concern for both advanced and emerging economies, for their potential impact on inflation, even in the face of the sluggish pace of global economic growth. 
